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We introduce a model based on Ordinary Differential Equations to describe how
two mutually exclusive groups progress through a career hierarchy, whether in a
single organization, or in an entire economic sector. The intended application is
to gender imbalance at the top of the academic hierarchy in European Universi-
ties, however, the model is entirely generic and may be applied in other contexts
also. Previous research on gender imbalance in European universities has focused
on large-scale statistical studies. Our model represents a point of departure, as it is
deterministic (i.e. based on Ordinary Differential Equations). The model requires a
precise definition of the progression rates for the different groups through the hier-
archy; these are key parameters governing the dynamics of career progression. The
progression rate for each group can be decomposed into a product: the proportion
of group members at a low level in the hierarchy who compete for promotion to the
next level a given year, multiplied by the in-competition success rate for the group
in question. Either of these two parameters can differ across the groups under con-
sideration; this introduces a group asymmetry into the organization’s composition.
We introduce a glass-ceiling index to summarize this asymmetry succinctly. Using
case studies from the literature, we demonstrate how the mathematical framework
can pinpoint the proximate cause of the glass ceiling in European academia.
INTRODUCTION
In Europe, women and men make up roughly equal numbers at the entry level of the academic
career hierarchy. However, European academia has a glass ceiling: the proportion of women at
the top of the academic hierarchy is less than the proportion of women in the university system
as a whole [1]. To understand the root cause of this effect, a range of different factors has been
investigated, including implicit bias [2], stereotypes [3], the different emphasis placed on family
life by women and men [4], and the different institutional responsibilities undertaken by women
and men [5]. And yet, conclusions on the role of these factors are still unclear (e.g. [6, 7]).
Therefore, in order to make progress in understanding the glass ceiling in European academia,
we propose instead to look at the proximate cause of the glass ceiling. By this focus, it is
proposed to bring some clarity to the above debate, with a view to formulating more precise
research questions regarding the underlying cause of the glass ceiling in European academia.
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2The present work is focused on Europe, this is justified by the availability of extensive official
statistics and cross-country comparisons [1], as well as large-scale studies of the promotion
systems in Spain, France, and Italy [8–11]. The latter are based on regression analyses whereby
the probability of promotion is linked to gender, as well as other factors. This is an important
first step in understanding the proximate cause of the glass ceiling in European universities. We
emphasize that the mathematical model developed here is generic, and will have applicability
beyond Europe as well.
This work is different but complementary to the above statistical-modelling approach. We
formulate an abstract model of an organizational hierarchy, broken into two mutually exclusive
groups, the P -group and the Q-group. In the present context, the P -group refers to men and
the Q-group to women, however, the model is completely general, and can be applied equally
well to other pairs of mutually exclusive groups which together make up the organization. At
the same time, and for simplicity, the organizational hierarchy is assumed to be binary, with an
entry level and a managerial level. Members of both groups progress from the entry level to the
managerial level, but the progression rates for the P -group and the Q-group are not necessarily
the same in the model. We also extend the the model to hierarchies with more than two levels.
We emphasize that the model applies equally to a single organization, or to an entire economic
sector; we use the term ‘organization’ throughout this article for definiteness.
I. FORMULATION
We set up a mathematical model of an idealized organization made up of N employees. We
model how N varies with time t, starting from a given set of initial conditions at t = 0. The
employees can be categorized in two well-defined, non-overlapping groups, the P -group and the
Q-group, with total populations Ptot(t) and Qtot(t), respectively, such that Ptot(t) +Qtot(t) =
N(t). The organizational hierarchy is assumed to be simple, with two levels – an entry level
(labelled with a subscript 1) and a managerial level (labelled with a subscript 2). As such,
the P -group can be decomposed as P1(t) + P2(t) = Ptot(t), where P1 denotes the number of
members of the P -group at the entry level; a similar decomposition applies to the Q-group
also. Hence, P1(t) + P2(t) +Q1(t) +Q2(t) = N(t). A more complicated four-level model is also
developed (Section 6). The model is further assumed to have the following characteristics:
1. Time is measured in years.
2. Apart from the binarization of the population into the specified groups and career levels,
the population is otherwise homogeneous.
3. The total organizational headcount grows according to dN/dt = λN , where λ is a constant
with dimensions of [Number of indivudals]−1[Year]−1.
4. There are no resignations, deaths in service, redundancies, or dismissals – employees leave
the organization only through retirements.
5. The organization recruits members of both groups at equal rates. Recruitment is only
at the entry level; access to the managerial level is by promotion only. Once at the
managerial level, employees cannot return to the entry level – there is no ‘demotion’ of
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6. Employees of the P - and Q-groups retire at equal rates; employees at the different levels
in the hierarchy retire at different rates.
7. There is an overall ‘crude’ retirement rate set by the average length of service.
8. The total number of employees at the managerial level is constrained, with (P2+Q2)/N =
ϕ, where 0 < ϕ < 1 is a constant. Correspondingly, (P1 +Q1)/N = 1 − ϕ.
Further discussion about the appropriateness of these assumptions to a university setting is
given in the Appendix.
Model equations
Based on the above assumptions, we introduce the following pair of ODEs to describe the
composition of the P -group:
dP1
dt
= s − r1P1 − µP1, (1a)
dP2
dt
= µP1 − r2P2. (1b)
Here, s is the source function governing the rate at which individuals of the P -group are re-
cruited into the organization; this quantity has dimensions of [Number of individuals][Year]−1.
The source function s depends on time. The other coefficients in (1) have the interpretation
of rate coefficients, possibly time-dependent. The rate coefficients r1 and µ have physical units
of [Percentage][Year]−1; r1 can be interpreted as the proportion of a P1-individuals who retire
per year (‘retirement rate’), and µ can be interpreted as the proportion of all P1-individuals
who are promoted to the managerial level, per year (‘progression rate’). Similarly, r2 is the
proportion of P2-individuals who retire per year. Finally, it should be noted that (1) is valid
for t > 0; at t = 0, initial conditions apply, e.g. P1(t = 0) = P10, P2(t = 0) = P20, where P10
and P20 are constants.
The equations for the Q-group are very similar to those already written down for the P -
group:
dQ1
dt
= s − r1Q1 − µ′Q1, (2a)
dQ2
dt
= µ′Q1 − r2Q2. (2b)
The source function and the retirement rates are the same in (1) and (2), as per Assump-
tions (5)–(6). Equality of the source functions for the different groups is justified by the official
statistics [1]. The progression rate in (2) is µ′. The model therefore allows for asymmetric
progression rates µ ≠ µ′.
(2) is valid for t > 0; at t = 0, initial conditions again apply at t = 0, e.g. Q1(t = 0) =
Q10, Q2(t = 0) = Q20. The initial conditions for the P - and Q-groups are not all indepen-
dent, indeed, we must have P10 +P20 +Q10 +Q20 = N0, where N0 is the total headcount at t = 0;
4moreover, we must have P10 +Q10 = (1−ϕ)N0 and P20 +Q20 = ϕN0. The motivation for writing
down Equations (1)–(2) in their present form is that they represent a ‘conservation-of-people’
or ‘balance’ principle, whereby entry into the organization, and exit therefrom, are governed by
well-defined mechanisms. In particular, individuals enter the organization via recruitment and
leave via retirement. Individuals may move from one level in the hierarchy to the next – the
loss of one person from the entry level represents a gain at the managerial level. As such (1)–(2)
represent the simplest possible set of equations that can be written down that describe this
balance principle.
II. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
The basic model (1)–(2) contains a plethora of parameters. However, not all of these are
independent. We have proved a number of theorems whose purpose is to reduce the number
of independent parameters down to a minimum. We summarize these results here. Detailed
discussion is provided in the Appendix.
Theorem II.1 The source term is not arbitrary; it is given by
s(t) = 12 (λ + rˆ)N0eλt, (3)
where rˆ is the crude retirement rate rˆ = r1(1 − ϕ) + r2ϕ.
The crude retirement rate rˆ is known – it is simply r = 1/T , where T is the average length
of service. Similarly, the retirement rate r2 is known – if T∗ is the average time between
recruitment and promotion, then r2 = (T − T∗)−1. As such, we have the following theorem:
Theorem II.2 The retirement rate r1 is given by
r1 = (rˆ − r2ϕ)/(1 − ϕ). (4)
We next define a crude progression rate µˆ, such that µˆ(P1 +Q1) = µP1 + µ′Q1. We have:
Theorem II.3 The crude progression rate µˆ is given by
µˆ = (r2 + λ)ϕ/(1 − ϕ). (5)
With the value of µˆ prescribed, it is possible to write the independent progression rates µ and
µ′ in a more succinct form. As such, we write µ′ = kµ, where k is a non-negative constant. If
k < 1 there is a preference for the P -group in the promotion system; otherwise, if k > 1 there
is a preference for the Q-group. Given the definition of µˆ, we have µ = µˆ(P1 +Q1)/(P1 + kQ1),
or µ = µˆΨ(P1,Q1), where Ψ = (P1 +Q1)/(P1 + kQ1) is homogeneous in each of its variables, i.e.
Ψ(xP1, xQ1) = Ψ(P1,Q1), for all x ≠ 0.
In an analysis of the structure of the organization in terms of the P - and Q-groups, what is
of interest is not the headcounts P1, . . . ,Q2 but rather the proportion of individuals at a given
career level. As such, we introduce the scaled variables p1 = P1/N , p2 = P2/N , q1 = Q1/N , and
q2 = Q2/N . We have the following theorem:
5Theorem II.4 Given (1)–(2), the scaled variables satisfy the following ODEs:
dp1
dt
= s0 − (r1 + λ)p1 − µˆΨ(p1, q1)p1, (6a)
dp2
dt
= µˆΨ(p1, q1)p1 − (r2 + λ)p2, (6b)
dq1
dt
= s0 − (r1 + λ)q1 − µˆkΨ(p1, q1)q1, (6c)
dq2
dt
= µˆkΨ(p1, q1)q1 − (r2 + λ)q2, (6d)
where s0 = s(t)/N(t) = (λ + rˆ)/2.
The proof follows by direct computation; the homogeneity of the Ψ is a key part of the com-
putation. In the remainder of the paper we work with the scaled model in (6).
III. STEADY-STATE SOLUTION
We examine steady-state solutions of (6) obtained by setting the time derivatives on the
left-hand side equal to zero. The results give further insight into the structure of the model as
well as giving the motivation for introducing the glass-ceiling index. As such, we obtain
s0 = (r1 + λ)p1 + µˆΨp1, µˆΨp1 = (r2 + λ)p2, (7a)
s0 = (r1 + λ)q1 + kµˆΨq1, µˆkΨq1 = (r2 + λ)q2. (7b)
These are algebraic equations which can be solved to give explicit solutions.
The case k = 0 is special, and corresponds to the steady state q2 = 0. The full solution in
this case is discussed in the Appendix. The solution comes with the requirement
ϕ ≤ (rˆ + λ − s0)/(r2 + λ). (8)
As k = 0 is an extreme case, (8) can be thought of as a sufficient condition such that p1 ≥ 0 at
the steady state; indeed, this can be assumed to be a general condition to avoid a population
crash where p1 → 0 in finite time. As such, in the remainder of this work, we assume that (8)
holds.
A second special case is k = 1, which corresponds to symmetric p- and q- populations. In this
case, it is readily seen that p2 = q2 = ϕ/2 and p1 = q2 = (1−ϕ)/2 in the steady state. Otherwise,
a general solution pertains; in the Appendix is is shown by straightforward calculation that
the general solution is parametrized as follows (we use an asterisk to denote the steady state):
(p1∗, p2∗, q1∗, q2∗) = ( 1 − ϕ
1 + (x/k) , ϕ1 + x, xk 1 − ϕ1 + (x/k) , xϕ1 + x) ,
where x is the solution (positive branch) of a quadratic equation:
x2 + (k − 1)x [(ϕ/s0)(r2 + λ) − 1] − k = 0, (9)
6We introduce the glass-ceiling index g(t) to display these results graphically:
g(t) = Proportion of organization made up by Q-group
Proportion of managerial level made up by Q-group= (Q1 +Q2)/N
Q2/(Q2 + P2) = ϕ(1 + q1q2) . (10)
Correspondingly, we introduce g∗ = limt→∞ g(t). Hence, from Equation (III), we have
g∗ = ϕ(1 + 1 − ϕ
ϕ
1 + x
k + x) . (11)
A sample curve g∗(k) is shown in Figure 1. The value g∗ = 1 corresponds to k = 1, hence
complete symmetry between the p- and q-groups.
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FIG. 1. Glass-ceiling index g∗ as a function of the asymmetry parameter k, as given by (11). Model
parameters – for illustration purposes only: λ = 0 (steady-state headcount), rˆ = (1/35) [Years]−1,
r2 = (1/15) [Years]−1, ϕ = 0.245
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FIG. 2. The glass-ceiling index g(t) as a function of time for various values of the headcount growth
rate λ, starting with λ = 0.01 and moving monotonically through the values λ = 0.02,0.03,0.04, to
λ = 0.05. The initial conditions can be read from the graph in the inset. Other parameters common
to all curves: rˆ = 1/35 [Years]−1, r2 = 1/15 [Years]−1.
IV. DYNAMICS
When k = 1 the p- and q-populations are symmetric and the populations relax over time to
the steady state p2 = q2 = ϕ/2 and p1 = q1 = (1 − ϕ)/2. In this scenario, we have Ψ = 1, and the
ODEs for the p- and q-groups become decoupled; indeed, the model ODEs reduce to a linear set
of ODEs which can be solved via the standard integrating-factor technique. The details of these
solutions are provided in the Appendix; what matters is the appearance of the exponential
factors e−(r1+µˆ+λ)t and e−(r2+λ)t in the solutions, which multiply the initial conditions. As such,
the effect of the initial conditions is attenuated over time, the attenuation is governed by the
‘decay times’ τ1 = (r1 + µˆ + λ)−1 and τ2 = (r2 + λ)−1.
In universities, positive headcount growth is generally seen as positive (in other contexts it
8might be a sign of organizational inefficiency). Hence, we assume λ ≥ 0 in the remainder of this
article. Attenuation is only as fast as the longest timescale of τ1 and τ2. As such, for λ ≥ 0,
we identify an overall attenuation rate τ∗ = max(τ1, τ2) = (r2 + λ)−1. From this expression, it
is clear that both the retirement rate r2 and a headcount growth rate λ ≥ 0 act together to
attenuate the initial conditions and to hasten the onset of the steady state. As such, the onset
of the steady state p2/p1 = q2/q1 = ϕ/(1 − ϕ) can be hastened by increasing either r2 or λ.
We use numerical solutions of (6) to demonstrate the effect of λ on the glass-ceiling index –
this is shown in Figure 2. An increase in the headcount growth rate λ accelerates the conver-
gence of the glass-ceiling index to its long-term steady value. For instance, if an organization
deems it desirable to have 40% female representation at the management level and 50% female
representation in the organization as a whole, this corresponds to g = 1.25. For the parameters
in Figure 2, this can be achieved in 12 years for λ = 0.01 [Years]−1, and in only 6 years for
λ = 0.05 [Years]−1.
V. DECOMPOSITION OF THE PROGRESSION RATE
We decompose the progression rates, thereby obtaining a more fundamental understanding
of the asymmetry µ ≠ µ′. The decomposition for the P -group is given by
µ = [ Number of P -individuals moving to the managerial level,
as a proportion of all P -individuals at the entry level
]/ [Year]
= [ Number of P -individuals under consideration for promotion,
as a proportion of all P -individuals at the entry level
]
× [ Success rate of theP -individuals in the promotion system ]/ [Year] = ν × σ, (12)
where ν is the first factor in the product µ = ν × σ and σ is the second factor – as such ν has
dimensions of [Year]−1 and σ is a a pure percentage, with σ ∈ [0,1]× 100%. We similarly write
µ′ = ν′ × σ′ (in an obvious notation).
Accordingly, we classify the promotion system according to the parameters ν, ν′, σ, and σ′
as follows:
• Supply-side bias: σ = σ′, ν ≠ ν′.
• In-competition bias: ν = ν′, σ ≠ σ′.
• Multiple biases: ν ≠ ν′ and σ ≠ σ′.
• Symmetry: ν = ν′, σ = σ′.
The Cascade Model
In certain contexts [12], the so-called cascade model of promotions has been implemented
to bring about equality between the P -group and the Q-group at the managerial level. The
9cascade model stipulates that the proportion of P s and Qs to be recruited or promoted to
a certain level is based on the proportion of each at the career level directly below. This
requirement is equivalent to enforcing k = 1, in the context of our model:
Theorem V.1 The cascade model requires that k = 1.
The proof is straightforward and is provided in the Appendix. From the classification of
biases, it can be seen that k = 1 does not exclude bias: the cascade model is free from bias
provided only supply-side and in-competition biases are both eliminated. As such, we have the
following corollary to Theorem .4
Corollary V.2 If the promotion system has a supply-side bias, then implementation of the
cascade model requires the introduction of a compensatory in-competition bias.
VI. APPLICATION TO GENDER BALANCE IN EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIES
We apply our model to academic staff in European universities, with Q = women and P =
men. For the purposes comparison between different Member States of the European Union,
the academic career hierarchy is standardized across the European Union and is broken into
four levels [1]. Using common terminology, Level D corresponds to the entry level (PhD /
Postdoc), Level C corresponds to Assistant Professor, Level B to Associate Professor, and
Level A to Full Professor. This makes comparison between the European Union data and our
own simplified two-level model difficult. We therefore extend our two-level model to allow for
four levels. We do not solve the resulting equations; instead, it suffices to identify the limiting
step for promotions to the highest level and thereby to compare with the official data. The
official data used for these purposes are the summary statistics published by the European
Commission (the ‘She Figures’) [1].
Four-level model
We introduce a four-equation model, by direct generalization from the two-level (1)–(2). For
the P -group, we have:
dPD
dt
= SP (t) − rDPD − µDPD, (13a)
dPC
dt
= µDPD − rCPC − µCPC , (13b)
dPB
dt
= µCPC − rBPB − µBPB, (13c)
dPA
dt
= µBPB − rAPA. (13d)
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Similarly, for the Q-group, we have
dQD
dt
= SQ(t) − rDQD − µ′DQD, (13e)
dQC
dt
= µ′DQD − rCQC − µ′CQC , (13f)
dQB
dt
= µ′CQC − rBQB − µ′BQB, (13g)
dQA
dt
= µ′BQB − rAQA. (13h)
Here, the rate coefficients rA, . . . , rD characterize retirements, these are assumed to be the same
for the P -group and the Q-group. The coefficients µA, . . . , µD, µ′A, . . . , µ′D are progression rates,
which may be different for the P -group and the Q-group. Finally, SP (t) and SQ(t) are source
functions (possibly distinct); these are chosen such that the total headcount
N = ∑
i=A,B,C,DPi + ∑i=A,B,C,DQi
grows at a set rate, dN/dt = λN .
In this context, the glass-ceiling index defined in the ‘She Figures’,
g(4)(t) = QA +QB +QC
QA +QB +QC + PA + PB + PC / QAQA + PA (14)
can be applied directly to the four-level model (13). From the definition (14), the limiting factor
which prevents g(4) from being equal to one is the progression from level B to level A. As such,
in the remainder of this section, we study the progression rates µB and µ′B. We decompose
these as µB = νσ and µ′B = ν′σ′, where in this new context ν denotes the proportion of men
at level B entering the competition for promotion to level A in a typical year, and σ denotes
the success rate of men in the competition for promotion from level B to level A. The same
interpretation holds for ν′ and σ′ for women. As such we explore whether supply-side bias,
in-competition bias, or a combination of both, is applicable in selected European countries.
We first of all provide some context for our study, using official data of the European Com-
mission for the year 2015 [1]. The average value was g(4) = 1.75, averaged over all Member
States. This corresponds to more men than women at Level A. The glass-ceiling index for
selected countries is shown in Table I. To understand the reasons behind the different values of
g(4) in Table I, we discuss our model in the context of econometric literature on gender balance
in the hierarchy in European Universities. We focus our review on France, Italy, and Spain,
which currently (2019) organize national central competitions to determine promotion to the
highest academic grade.
Spain
Zinovyeva and Bagues [8] have looked at the Spanish academic promotion system in the years
2002-2006. In these years, the system was based a national examination (Habilitacio´n). Expert
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TABLE I. Academic hierarchy by gender, selected countries. Taken from the ‘She Figures 2015’ (Table
6.1 therein).
Country D (F/M) C (F/M) B (F/M) A (F/M) g(4)
France 41/59 30/70 40/60 19/81 1.72
Italy 50/50 45/55 35/65 21/79 1.73
Spain 51/49 49/51 40/60 21/79 1.80
EU-28 47/53 45/55 37/63 21/79 1.75
evaluation committees were convened, by random selection from a national pool of professors.
The authors used a regression model is used to determine how the probability p of success in
the competition depends on the gender of applicants, as well as other applicant attributes (age,
academic productivity, etc.). By random selection, some evaluation committees have an all-
men composition – this facilitated a ‘natural experiment’ whereby the effect of the committee
composition on promotion prospects can be studied. For academics in the competition, it was
found that p depends on gender – men had on average a higher probability of success. The
difference is p = 10.2% for men and p = 8.9% for women. This was found to be statistically
significant. The difference vanished for mixed-gender panels.
Using the above findings, and the summary statistics included in the study, we have identified
values which correspond to σ, ν, etc. in our model (13). We use the given data that in the period
reported, men made up 65% of the headcount at the Associate Professor level, and women made
up 35% – these combined make up the pool of applicants for the Full-Professor level. At the same
time, there were 6,037 individuals who applied for promotion to the top level. However, many
applicants applied more than once – the average number of applications per candidate in the
given time period was just over two. As such, there were 9,480 applications by men candidates,
and 3,744 applications by women candidates, corresponding to a total of 13,224 applications.
From these numbers, the ratio ν/ν′ may be expressed as ν/ν′ = (9480/0.65)/(3744/0.35) ≈ 1.36.
Equally, σ and σ′ can be identified with the average probability of success for men and women
candidates respectively, hence σ/σ′ = 10.2%/8.9% ≈ 1.14. Using the difference operator ∆Φ =
ΦP −ΦQ, where Φ is any one of µ, ν, and σ, we obtain the following relation via the standard
expression for the difference of a product:
∆(σν)
σν
= ∆ν
ν
+ ∆σ
σ
. (15)
As such, we can identify ∆ν/ν = (1.36 − 1)/1.36 = 0.26 and ∆σ/σ = (1.14 − 1)/1.14 = 0.12.
Hence, the effect of ν ≠ ν′ contributes twice as strongly as the effect of σ ≠ σ′ in determin-
ing the asymmetry in the progression rate between men and women. In other words, the
system is asymmetric between men and women mostly because of the supply-side effect, but
in-competition bias plays a role also.
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France
Bosquet et al. [9] have examined the French academic promotion system in Economics be-
tween 1991-2008, where promotion (in all subjects) is based on a national competition. The
data consist of academics who applied for promotion, and those who did not. The authors
were therefore able to distinguish between these two groups, and introduced a probability p(S)
of success for a candidate, conditional on his/her having applied for promotion. The authors
constructed a regression model for p(S). The results showed a differences in p(S) for men and
women, but they were not statistically significant. The authors were further able to demon-
strate that the main reason for the gender asymmetry at the top of the hierarchy is in the
difference in the proportion of men and women who enter the promotion competitions, i.e. a
supply-side effect. The regression analysis can therefore be used to compute the parameters of
our own model, σ, ν, etc. In summary, the data fro France are imply σ = σ′ but ν ≠ ν′ (full
details provided in the Appendix).
Italy – Local Competitions
De Paola and Scoppa [10] have examined the Italian academic promotion system for Asso-
ciate Professor (Level B) and Full Professor (Level A) positions in the years 2008-2011, when
the system was based on institutional-level (local) competitions. The data for the entire coun-
try were collated by the Ministry for Education and made available for research purposes. The
reference focuses on competitions in Economics and Chemistry. Competitions for promotions
to Associate and Full Professor are grouped together. The authors used a regression model to
determine how the probability p of success in the competitions depends on gender, as well as
other factors. A statistically significant dependence on gender was found, with p = 8.9% for
women and with p = 13% for men. However, the difference almost vanished in cases where
candidates were assessed by mixed-gender panels. Based on the given values of p, the number
of candidates entering the competition, and the composition by gender of the pool of potential
candidates for the Full Professor positions, we have computed ∆ν/ν = 0.06 and ∆σ/σ = 0.40
(full details in the Appendix). Hence, the asymmetry in the progression rates for progression
to Level A is due almost entirely to in-competition bias.
Italy – National Competitions
A reformed, national-level competition (Abilitazione Scientifica Nazionale, ASN) for pro-
motion to both Associate Professor and Full Professor has been introduced in Italy, and the
results for the years 2012-2014 were studied in a follow-on paper by de Paola et al. [11]. Data
for the entire set of Italian academics were examined (i.e. data corresponding to academics who
do not enter the competitions, as well as those that do). The authors were therefore able to
examine the probability that an individual academic will enter the competition, as well as the
probability that an individual academic will succeed in the competition, conditional on having
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entered. The authors found that overall, a female academic has a statistically significant lower
probability of entering the competition. Interestingly, the main effect documented in the first
study [11] (different male/female success rates) vanished for the ASN – the probability that an
individual academic will succeed in the competition, conditional on having entered, is the same
for men and women (no statistically significant difference). Hence, in the reformed competition,
the asymmetry in the progression rates for progression to Level A is again due to a supply-side
effect.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Summarizing, we have introduced a deterministic model to describe how the structure of an
organization’s hierarchy changes over time. The model categorizes staff into two groups (P -
group and Q-group) – and makes a prediction for the long-time balance between the P -group
and the Q-group at the top of the hierarchy. The model is broadly applicable in a public-sector
context with security of tenure, and most applicable in a university setting where headcount
growth is a desirable organizational aim. The model is generic, however we have applied it in
a context where P = men and Q = women.
We have defined precisely the progression rates which control the long-term steady state
of the model. We have decomposed the progression rates into their component parts – this
pinpoints the proximate cause of any gender imbalance in the organizational hierarchy – supply-
side bias and in-competition bias.
We have extended the model to a four-level system and applied it to European University
systems. Using data from large-scale studies of three countries, we have estimated the relevant
model parameters (in particular, the components of the progression rates for progression to
the highest academic level) for France, Italy, and Spain. The analysis reveals that supply-side
effects play the main role in the gender imbalance at the top of the academic hierarchy in these
countries.
It will be of interest in future work to gather data (progression rates, retirement rates, etc.)
for a range of countries, and thereby to make predictions concerning the long-term composition
of the academic hierarchy throughout the European Union (and beyond). As part of any such
study, the question of retirement rates should be revisited – in the countries studied herein
these are the same for men and women, although this should be checked carefully for each
country under consideration. Indeed, a quick sensitivity analysis of the underlying differential
equations in our model indicates that differential retirement rates will also have a strong effect
on the steady-state model solutions.
Furthermore, it will be of interest to revisit Assumption 2, namely the homogeneity of the
populations. In studies of gender equality, paradoxes of amalgamation often arise, whereby
an amalgamated success rate tells a different story from success rates broken down by disci-
pline [13, 14]. Therefore, in future, the modelling approach developed herein may be applied
on a discipline-by-discipline level, eventually building from the bottom up to a comprehensive
amalgamated picture of entire universities, and more broadly, entire university systems.
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Appendix
This appendix is formatted in numbered sections which mirror the sections in the main
paper. As such, Section 1 is concerned with the formulation of the model; here further in-
depth discussion concerning the model assumptions is provided. Section 2 contains the proofs
of the theorems proposed in the main paper. Section 3 gives the details behind the derivation
of the algebraic steady-state solutions. Section 4 gives the details behind the derivation of
the dynamic solutions in the case where k = 1. Section 5 is concerned with the fundamental
decomposition of the progression rates, in particular, we prove the theorem that the so-called
cascade model implies k = 1 – this theorem is only stated (with context) in the main paper. In
Section 6 we provide details and supporting calculations for the application of our model to
real academic promotion systems in Spain, France, and Italy.
1. Formulation
For completeness, we recall the model assumptions here:
1. Time is measured in years.
2. Apart from the binarization of the population into the specified groups and career levels,
the population is otherwise homogeneous.
3. The total organizational headcount grows according to
dN
dt
= λN, (A.1)
where λ is a constant with dimensions of [Number of indivudals]−1[Year]−1.
4. There are no resignations, deaths in service, redundancies, or dismissals – employees leave
the organization only through retirements.
5. The organization recruits members of both groups at equal rates. Recruitment is only
at the entry level; access to the managerial level is by promotion only. Once at the
managerial level, employees cannot return to the entry level – there is no ‘demotion’ of
managers.
6. Employees of the P - and Q-groups retire at equal rates; employees at the different levels
in the hierarchy retire at different rates.
7. There is an overall ‘crude’ retirement rate set by the average length of service.
8. The total number of employees at the managerial level is constrained, with (P2+Q2)/N =
ϕ, where 0 < ϕ < 1 is a constant. Correspondingly, (P1 +Q1)/N = 1 − ϕ.
The model represents a first approximation to a university or other public research institution –
these organizations tend to consider growth in headcount to be desirable as (other things being
equal) it corresponds to a reduced staff-student ratio and an increase in the inputs required for
academic and scientific research. Elsewhere (in both the private and public sectors), growth
in headcount may well be a sign of organizational inefficiency. This is the justification for
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emphasizing assumption (3). Equally, the model assumes low staff turnover, which is typical of
universities and public research institutions – hence assumption (4). We emphasize further that
the model assumption (5) means that members of the P -group and the Q-group are recruited
into the organization at the entry level in equal numbers. As such, the model admits an
asymmetry between the P - and Q-groups only by allowing for different progression rates from
the entry level to the managerial level for both groups.
It will be helpful to recall the model equations here in a self-contained fashion, for ease of
reference in what follows. We also take the opportunity further to connect the assumptiosn to
the model equations. As such, we recall:
dP1
dt
= s − r1P1 − µP1, (A.2a)
dP2
dt
= µP1 − r2P2. (A.2b)
The notation is identical to that in the main paper: s is the source function governing the
rate at which individuals of the P -group are recruited into the organization; this quantity
has dimensions of [Number of individuals][Year]−1. The source function s depends on time.
The other coefficients in Equation (A.2) have the interpretation of rate coefficients, possibly
time-dependent. In particular,
• r1 is the rate at which members of the P -group at the entry level retire.
• µ is the rate at which members of the P -group at the entry level are promoted to the
managerial level.
These quantities both have dimensions of [Percentage][Year]−1. As such, r1 can be interpreted
as the proportion of a P1-individuals who retire per year (‘retirement rate’), and µ can be
interpreted as the proportion of all P1-individuals who are promoted to the managerial level,
per year (‘progression rate’). The fact that r1 ≠ 0 means that some of the members of the
P -group at entry level are never promoted to managerial level and spend their whole length
of service at the entry level. Finally, r2 can be interpreted as the proportion of P2-individuals
who retire per year (this is again referred to as a ‘retirement rate’). In general, the rates r1 and
r2 will be different. It should be noted that Equations (A.2) are valid for t > 0; at t = 0, initial
conditions apply:
P1(t = 0) = P10, P2(t = 0) = P20, (A.3)
where P10 and P20 are constants corresponding to the initial values of the different P -
populations. The equations for the Q-group are very similar to those already written down for
the P -group:
dQ1
dt
= s − r1Q1 − µ′Q1, (A.4a)
dQ2
dt
= µ′Q1 − r2Q2. (A.4b)
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The source function and the retirement rates are the same in Equations (A.2) and (A.4), as
per Assumptions (5)–(6). The progression rate in Equation (A.4) is µ′. Finally, we recall:
P1(t) + P2(t) +Q1(t) +Q2(t) = N(t). (A.5)
2. Theoretical Analysis
In this section we prove the various theorems stated in the main part of the paper, starting
with
Theorem.1 The source term is not arbitrary; it is given by
s(t) = 12 (λ + rˆ)N0eλt, (A.6)
where rˆ is the crude retirement rate.
Proof We begin by noting that Equations (A.2) and (A.4) may be combined to give
2s − r1(P1 +Q1) − r2(P2 +Q2) = d
dt
(P1 + P2 +Q1 +Q2) ,
Eq. (A.5)= dN
dt
,
Eq. (A.1)= λN.
We therefore have N = N0eλt. We further identify the crude retirement rate via the definition
rˆN = r1(P1 +Q1) + r2(P2 +Q2). (A.7)
Combining the above equations, we obtain
2s − rˆN = λN, (A.8)
from which the result follows, using N = N0eλt.
We also recall:
Theorem.2 The retirement rate r1 is given by
r1 = rˆ − r2ϕ
1 − ϕ . (A.9)
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Proof The result (A.14) follows directly from the definition of the crude retirement rate in
Equation (A.7); this equation can be rewritten as
rˆ = r1 (P1 +Q1
N
) + r2 (P2 +Q2
N
) .
As the ratios (P1 +Q1)/N and (P2 +Q2)/N are assumed constant (cf. Assumption (8)), the
above can be rewritten as
rˆ = r1(1 − ϕ) + r2ϕ,
hence r1 = (rˆ − r2ϕ)/(1 − ϕ) and the result is shown.
We next revisit the progression rates µ and µ′. The starting-point here is to recall that(P2 +Q2)/N = ϕ = Const., hence (d/dt)[(P2 +Q2)/N] = 0, and
d
dt
(P2 +Q2) − 1
N
dN
dt
(P2 +Q2) = 0. (A.10)
Hence also,
d
dt
(P2 +Q2) = λ(P2 +Q2). (A.11)
We combine this result with Equations (A.2) and (A.4) to obtain
µP1 + µ′Q1 − r2(P2 +Q2) = λ(P2 +Q2). (A.12)
This motivates the definition of the crude progression rate µˆ in the main paper:
µˆ(P1 +Q1) = µP1 + µ′Q1. (A.13)
Combining Equations (A.12) and (A.13) we have the theorem from the main part of the paper:
Theorem.3 The crude progression rate µˆ is given by
µˆ = (r2 + λ) ( ϕ
1 − ϕ) . (A.14)
Proof We combine Equations (A.12) and (A.13) to produce
µˆ(P1 +Q1) = (λ + r2)(P2 +Q2).
We divide across by P1 +Q1
µˆ = (λ + r2) (P2 +Q2
P1 +Q1) .
The ratio (P2 +Q2)/(P1 +Q1) can be rewritten as [(P2 +Q2)/N]/[(P1 +Q1)/N] = ϕ/(1 − ϕ) –
substituting this expression into the above equation gives the required result (A.14).
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3. Steady-state solution
We recall there the scaled dynamical equations introduced in Section 2 of the main paper:
dp1
dt
= s0 − (r1 + λ)p1 − µˆΨ(p1, q1)p1, (A.15a)
dp2
dt
= µˆΨ(p1, q1)p1 − (r2 + λ)p2, (A.15b)
dq1
dt
= s0 − (r1 + λ)q1 − µˆkΨ(p1, q1)q1, (A.15c)
dq2
dt
= µˆkΨ(p1, q1)q1 − (r2 + λ)q2, (A.15d)
where Ψ(p1, q2) = (p1 + q1)/(p1 +kq1). Steady-state solutions of Equation (A.15) are introduced
in Section 3 of the main paper. These are obtained by setting d/dt = 0 in Equation (A.15).
The purpose of the present section is to showcase the detailed calculations required to derive
these steady-state solutions.
By setting d/dt = 0 in Equation (A.15), we obtain the following algebraic equations:
s0 = (r1 + λ)p1 + µˆΨp1, µˆΨp1 = (r2 + λ)p2, (A.16a)
s0 = (r1 + λ)q1 + kµˆΨq1, µˆkΨq1 = (r2 + λ)q2. (A.16b)
Combining these equations gives
s0 − (r2 + λ)q2
s0 − (r2 + λ)p2 = q1p1 , k q1p1 = q2p2 (A.16c)
We now work through the different cases of k.
Special Case: k = 0
The case k = 0 is anomalous, and corresponds to the steady state q2 = 0. Hence, p2 = ϕ. In
this case, Equations (A.16) reduce to
s0 = (r1 + λ)p1 + µˆΨp1,
s0 = (r1 + λ)q1.
The second equation here gives
q1 = s0
r1 + λ.
But p1 + q1 = 1 − ϕ, hence
p1 = 1 − ϕ − s0
r1 + λ.
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Since p1 is a population, we require p1 ≥ 0, hence
ϕ ≤ rˆ + λ − s0
r2 + λ . (A.17)
As k = 0 is an extreme case, Equation (A.17) can be thought of as a sufficient condition such
that p1 ≥ 0 at the steady state; indeed, this can be assumed to be a general condition to avoid
a population crash where p1 → 0 in finite time. As such, in the remainder of this work, we
assume that Equation (A.17) holds.
Special Case: k = 1
When k = 1 the p- and q-populations are symmetric, and it can be anticipated that p2 = q2 =
ϕ/2, and p1 = q1 = (1 − ϕ)/2 in the steady state. This can be checked by direct calculation on
Equations (A.16).
General Solution
We introduce x = q2/p2, hence xp2 = q2. But p2 + q2 = ϕ, hence p2 = ϕ/(1 + x). Hence,
Equation (A.16) simplifies:
s0 − (r2 + λ) xϕ1+x
s0 − (r2 + λ) ϕ1+x = xk . (A.18)
Equation (A.18) simplifies to a quadratic equation:
x2 + (k − 1)x [ϕ(r2 + λ)
s0
− 1] − k = 0, (A.19)
with solution
x = −12(k − 1) [ϕ(r2 + λ)s0 − 1] ± 12
¿ÁÁÀ(k − 1)2 [ϕ(r2 + λ)
s0
− 1]2 + 4k. (A.20)
Since x = q2/p2 is a population ratio, we choose the positive sign in front of the square-root in
Equation (A.20), which gives x ≥ 0.
Once x is determined from Equation (A.19), we work backwards and find p2 = p2∗ = ϕ/(1+x),
q2 = q2∗ = xϕ/(1+x) (we herein denote the steady-state solution with an asterisk). Furthermore,
we have q1/p1 = x/k, hence
p1 = p1∗ = 1 − ϕ
1 + (x/k) , q1 = q1∗ = xk 1 − ϕ1 + (x/k) .
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As such, there is a well-defined steady state of the model wherein (p1, q1, p2, q2) have definite
constant values, fixed by the parameter x. These are summarized here as follows, and match
up with the stated result in Section 3 of the main paper:
(p1∗, p2∗, q1∗, q2∗) = ( 1 − ϕ
1 + (x/k) , ϕ1 + x, xk 1 − ϕ1 + (x/k) , xϕ1 + x) . (A.21)
4. Dynamics
In this section we compute the exact solutions of the model equations (A.15) which are
available when k = 1. The methodology, context, and implications are discussed in Section 4 of
the main paper, here, we provide the details. The starting-point is Equation (A.15) with Ψ = 1.
Since both populations are now symmetric, it suffices to focus on the p-equations, which now
read
dp1
dt
= s0 − (r1 + λ)p1 − µˆp1, (A.22a)
dp2
dt
= µˆp1 − (r2 + λ)p2, (A.22b)
Equation (A.22a) is a standard first-order linear ODE, which can be solved via the integrating-
factor technique to give
p1(t) = [p1(0) − s0
r1 + µˆ + λ] e−(r1+µˆ+λ)t + s0r1 + µˆ + λ. (A.23)
We substitute this into Equation (A.22b), which now reads
dp2
dt
= µˆ{[p1(0) − s0
r1 + µˆ + λ] e−(r1+µˆ+λ)t + s0r1 + µˆ + λ} − (r2 + λ)p2. (A.24)
Equation (A.24) is a further first-order linear ODE, which has explicit solution
p2(t) = {p2(0) − µˆ s0
r1 + µˆ + λ 1r2 + λ − µˆ [p1(0) − 1r1 + µˆ + λ] 1(r2 − r1) − µˆ}e−(r2+λ)t
+ µˆ[p1(0) − 1r1+µˆ+λ] e−(r1+µˆ+λ)t(r2 − r1) − µˆ + µˆr2 + λ s0r1 + µˆ + λ. (A.25)
Furthermore, when k = 1, the p-equations and q-equations are copies of each other. As such,
the solution of the q-equations in this case can be read off from Equations (A.23) and (A.25),
with appropriate changes for the initial conditions.
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5. Decomposition of the Progression Rate
We recall the following theorem from Section 5 of the main paper:
Theorem.4 The cascade model requires that k = 1.
In this section we provide the proof, as follows:
Proof The number of Qs promoted in a given year, expressed as a fraction of all individuals
promoted in a given year is
µ′Q1
µ′Q1 + µP1 .
The cascade model requires that this should be equal to the number of Qs at the entry level,
expressed as a fraction of all individuals at the entry level:
µ′Q1
µ′Q1 + µP1 = Q1Q1 + P1 .
Both sides of this equation can be inverted to give
1 + µ
µ′P1 = Q1 + P1.
We divide both sides by N to obtain 1 + (µ/µ′)p1 = q1 + p1. But q1 + p1 = 1 − ϕ is fixed, hence(µ/µ′)p1 = p1. Assuming p1 ≠ 0, this gives µ/µ′ = 1, hence k = 1.
6. Application to Gender Balance in European Universities
In this section we provide the detailed supporting calculations which underlie the application
of the differential-equation model to real promotion systems in Spain, France, and Italy in
Section 6 of the main paper. In what follows, it is helpful to recall the features of the promotion
systems in these countries, as well as providing the details of the calculations.
Spain
Key points:
• A pioneering paper by Zinovyeva and Bagues [8] examines the Spanish academic
promotion system in the years 2002-2006.
• In these years, the system was based a national examination (Habilitacio´n):
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– Expert evaluation committees (7 members) are convenened, by random selection
from a national pool of professors.
– Evaluation is based on a resume´ and research proposal only (Full Professor –
Level A), or on a resume´, research proposal, and lectures (Associate Professor –
Level B).
– Candidates who qualify in the habilitacio´n may apply for positions at the uni-
versity level.
• A regression model is used to determine how the probability p of success in the
competition depends on the gender of applicants, as well as other applicant attributes
(age, academic productivity, etc.).
• By random selection, some evaluation committees have an all-male composition – this
facilitates a ‘natural experiment’ whereby the effect of the committee composition on
promotion prospects can be studied.
• For academics in the competition, p depends on gender – males have on average a
higher probability of success. The difference is p = 10.2% for males and p = 8.9% for
females. This is found to be statistically significant.
• The difference goes away when candidates are assessed by mixed-gender panels.
• The regression analysis can be used to estimate the parameters of our own model, σ,
ν, etc.
The model makes pie a linear function of gender, committee composition (number of female
members in the evaluation committee), and the number of positions in a particular subject
area destined to be filled. There is a direct effect of gender, and it is found to be statistically
significant at a 5% level – the average probability of a male candidate succeeding to the full-
professor level is 10.2% whereas the average probability for a female is 8.9%, a difference of 1.3
percentage points.
Using the above findings, and the summary statistics included in the study, it is possible to
identify parameter values which correspond to σ, ν, etc. in the four-level model. We use the
given data that in the period reported, males made up 65% of the headcount at the Associate
Professor level, and females made up 35% – these combined make up the pool of applicants
for the Full-Professor level. At the same time, there were 6,037 individuals who applied for
promotion to the top level. However, many applicants applied more than once – the average
number of applications per candidate in the given time period was just over two. As such,
there were 9,480 applications by male candidates, and 3,744 applications by female candidates,
corresponding to a total of 13,224 applications. From these numbers, the ratio ν/ν′ may be
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derived:
ν
ν′ =
[ Number of Males under consideration for promotion to Level A,
as a proportion of all males at Level B
] /[Year]
[ Number of Females under consideration for promotion to Level A,
as a proportion of all females at Level B
] /[Year]
= 9480/0.65
3744/0.35 ≈ 1.36. (A.26)
(the fact that the denominator and numerator both appear as rates on a per-year basis means
that the numerator and denominator can both be rescaled to appear as rates on a per-five-year
basis, to coincide with the duration of the study). Equally, σ and σ′ can be identified with the
average probability of success for male and female candidates respectively, hence
σ
σ′ = 10.2%8.9% = 1.14. (A.27)
Using the difference operator ∆Φ = ΦP −ΦQ, where Φ is any one of µ, ν, and σ, we obtain the
following relation via the relation
∆(σν)
σν
= ∆ν
ν
+ ∆σ
σ
. (A.28)
As such, we can identify ∆ν/ν = (1.36 − 1)/1.36 = 0.26 and ∆σ/σ = (1.14 − 1)/1.14 = 0.12.
France
Key points:
• A paper by Bosquet et al. [9] examines the French academic promotion system in
Economics between 1991-2008.
• In France, promotion (in all subjects) is based on a national competition (concours).
Candidates are evaluated by an evaluation committee.
• There are two academic career tracks: the universities, and the research institutes
(CNRS). The concours for each career track has its own characteristics. The paper
compares the outcomes of the two types of concours.
• The data presented in the study consists of academics who applied for promotion,
and those who did not. The study therefore distinguishes between these two groups,
and introduces a probability p(S) of success for a candidate, conditional on his/her
having applied for promotion.
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• A regression model for p(S) is constructed. This shows there are differences in p(S)
for males and females, but they are not statistically significant.
• The main reason for the gender asymmetry at the top of the hierarchy is in the differ-
ence in the proportion of males and females who enter the promotion competitions,
i.e. a supply-side effect.
• The regression analysis can be used to compute the parameters of our own model, σ,
ν, etc.
The authors constructed a linear model for the conditional probability pit(S) – this is the
probability that individual i is promoted at time t, conditional on his/her having entered the
concours. The probability is a linear function of gender, age, and academic productivity. The
authors find that there is a difference between the average probability of success for males and
females, but this is not statistically significant, either for the CNRS or the Universities. The
authors caution however that the results are not fully conclusive, as the lack of significance
could be due to the sample being small (there are, respectively, only 188 female candidates in
the University sample and 41 female candidates in the CNRS sample).
The authors further investigate the probability pit(A) that an individual i from the entire
pool of academic economists in the education system will enter the concours in a given year t.
The model is again a linear function of gender and other variables. Here, there is is a gender
difference, and it is found to be statistically significant at the 1% level. As such, the average
probabilities pit(A) are 9% per year for males, 6% for females (universities) and 20.3% per year
for males, 11.5%/[Year] for females (CNRS).
These figures are averages of probabilistic variables, and they can be related to the param-
eters of our own deterministic model (ν, σ, etc.). The authors identify probabilistic variables
which can be related to our own deterministic variables µ, ν, and σ (our deterministic variables
can be thought of as averages of the corresponding probabilistic ones). As such, the probabil-
ities pit(A) that an individual will enter a concours in a given year t, averaged over all males
or over all females, correspond to ν and ν′ in our model. Using this identification, we obtain
ν/ν′ ≈ 1.5 and ν/ν′ ≈ 1.76 for the universities and CNRS respectively. Furthermore, that the
average probabilities of success conditional on candidates having entered the concours are the
same for both males and females (have no statistically significant difference) means that σ = σ′
in our model.
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Italy – Local Competitions
Key points:
• A paper by de Paola and Scoppa [10] examines the Italian academic promotion system
for Associate and Full Professor positions in the years 2008-2011.
• In these years, the system was based on competitions organized at a local level:
– An institution with a vacancy convenes a committee.
– The committee selects two successful candidates.
– The top-ranked candidate receives the position within the institution.
– The second-ranked candidate is deemed promotable and enters a pool from which
other institutions can recruit him/her, should a vacancy arise.
– The rules for the composition of the panel were changed at the end of 2008 –
before, the committee was local, thereafter, only the first member was local. The
remaining 4 committee members were chosen at random from all full professors
in the country, in the relevant field.
• Study focuses on the competitions for promotion in Economics and Chemistry. Com-
petitions for promotions to Associate Professor (Level B) and Full Professor (Level
A) are grouped together. Data are obtained from official sources.
• A regression model is used to determine how the probability p of success in the
competitions depends on gender, as well as other factors.
• For academics in the competitions, p depends on gender – males have on average a
higher probability of success. The difference is p = 13% for males and p = 8.9% for
females. This is found to be statistically significant.
• The difference almost goes away when candidates are assessed by mixed-gender panels.
• The results from the regression analysis and calculations to disaggregate the data for
the Full Professorial level can be combined to generate estimates the parameters of
our own model, σ, ν, etc.
As in the previous works, the authors carry out a regression analysis to model the probability
of a candidate’s success as a function of gender, age, productivity, etc; the analysis is aggregated
over all competitions, for both Associate and Full Professor grades. Overall, it is found that
gender is the key variable that leads to a statistically significant difference in the probability of
a candidate’s being promoted. The average probability of success in a competition is 13% for
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males and 8.9% for females, this is found to be statistically significant at the 1% level. As in
the Spanish study, this difference vanishes for the case of mixed-gender evaluation panels.
We estimate average success rates and progression rates for Italy, for promotion to the level
of Full Professor. Because the statistical analysis has aggregated the data for the Full Professor
and Associate Professor competitions, the following calculations involve some estimates.
For these purposes, we use the stated fact in the paper that in the period reported, males
made up 66% of the headcount at the Associate Professor level, and females made up 34% –
these combined make up the pool of applicants for the full-professor level. At the same time,
the proportion of male candidates for promotion to the top level was 67.2% and the proportion
of female candidates was 32.8%. From these numbers, the ratio ν/ν′ may be derived:
ν
ν′ =
[ Number of Males under consideration for promotion to Level A,
as a proportion of all males at Level B
] /[Year]
[ Number of Females under consideration for promotion to Level A,
as a proportion of all females at Level B
] /[Year]
= 67.2/66
32.8/34 ≈ 1.06. (A.29)
A priori, it is not obvious if this difference is statistically significant. However, the results of a
follow-on study (see below) suggest that the difference is statistically significant.
At the same time, the mean success rate (averaged over male and female candidates) for
promotion to the top level is 10.2%. There is also a known discrepancy between the success
rates for males and females (averaged over all competitions, for both associate and full professor
levels), with ∆σ = 4.7%, in favour of males. Assuming rather conservatively that this difference
applies uniformly across both competitions, we obtain the following simultaneous equations:
σavg = 0.102 = σmale(0.672) + σfemale(0.328),
∆σ = 0.047 = σmale − σfemale,
hence σmale = σavg+∆σ(0.328) = 11.7%, hence (in the original notation), σ/σ′ = 11.7/(11.7−4.7) =
1.67. Accordingly, we can estimate
∆(σν)
σµ
= ∆ν
ν
+ ∆σ
σ
, (A.30)
with ∆ν/ν = (1.06 − 1)/1.06 = 0.06 and ∆σ/σ = (1.67 − 1)/1.67 = 0.40. Hence, the asymmetry
in the progression rates in the Italian data in the years 2008-2011 is due almost entirely to
in-competition bias.
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Italy – National Competitions
Key points:
• A follow-on paper by de Paola et al. [11] examines the reformed Italian academic
promotion system for Associate and Full Professor positions in the years 2012-2014.
• In these years, the system was based a national examination (Abilitazione Scientifica
Nazionale, ASN):
– Expert evaluation committees (5 members) are convened, by random selection
of all full professors.
– A candidate submits his/her CV. The CV is assessed by one of the committees,
appropriate by discipline.
– A candidate who is successful in the ASN is deemed promotable.
– A university with a vacancy may recruit only candidates who have passed the
ASN – passing the ASN is therefore necessary but not sufficient for promotion.
• Study focuses on the database of all Italian academics – those who enter the national
competition, and those who do not.
• The study can therefore identify the probability that an individual will enter the
competition.
• This probability depends on gender – a female has a lower probability of applying for
promotion of 5.2 percentage points.
In this follow-on paper, a more recent competition (2012-2014) is studied in depth (compe-
titions for both Associate Professor and Full Professor are again grouped together). Here, data
for the entire set of Italian academics is examined (i.e. data corresponding to academics who
do not enter the competitions, as well as those that do). In this way, the authors are able to
examine the probability that an individual academic will enter the competition, as well as the
probability that an individual academic will succeed in the competition, conditional on having
entered. The authors find that overall, a female academic has a lower probability of entering
the competition (A difference of 5.2 percentage points). The main effect documented in the
first study [11] (different male/female success rates) vanishes for the ASN – the probability that
an individual academic will succeed in the competition, conditional on having entered, is the
28
same for males and females (no statistically significant difference).
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